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Abstract 
Couchsurfing (CS) was founded in 2003 as a non-profit for those interested in 
creating a common resource for world-wide hospitality exchange and low cost 
tourism. Built around a non-market communal sharing model, it became a for-profit in 
August 2011. Applying a discourse relational model approach, this study 
characterizes how competing discursive articulations over the conversion led to a 
discursive strategy of moral justification as management sought to retain its 
non-profit, alternative, democratic imaginary. The study finds that the justifications 
gained initial appeal, but ultimately lost credibility due to a mismanaged conversion. 
By articulating the competing discourses through the sacred value protection model 
(SVPM), this study provides insights into the way in which a management strategy 
can be interpreted at a micro-analysis level. It recommends that management 
decisions need to start from the activities of the organizations members, groups and 
networks so as to account for their emotions, motivations and actions. 
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1. Introduction 
Couchsurfing (CS) was founded after a software programmer named Casey Fenton 
found a last-minute ticket to Iceland in 1999. To experience a ‘real Iceland’ through 
the people who lived there, he hacked into the University of Iceland student directory 
and ‘spammed’ students with requests for advice. He received more than fifty replies 
with offers of accommodation and assistance. In January 2003, Fenton along with 
Dan Hoffer, Sebastien LeTuan, and Leonardo Bassani de Silveira, launched CS as an 
intermediating technology platform that facilitated exchange activities. If you needed 
temporary accommodation, the CS platform would enable you to identify someone to 
give over sleeping space in their home for free. While CS was not the first hospitality 
exchange platform, its beginnings became a key ‘focus’ from which members 
developed a shared identity. It drew, connected and served a geographically dispersed 
network of strangers based around shared beliefs, norms of participation and attitudes 
towards hospitality, openness, tolerance, communal sharing, ethical invigoration and 
intercultural exchange (Mikołajewska-Zając, 2017).  
Official ‘Couchsurfing Values’ and a 2008 mission statement which envisioned 
‘a world where everyone can explore and create meaningful connections with the 
people and places they encounter’ offered the raw material for a shared culture 
(Picard & Buchberger, 2013). Participation was not market based, as each member 
acted on principles other than economic profit. Stories of trust, altruism and intimacy 
circulated despite differences in individual socio-economic background, ethnicity and 
self-interest (Dén-Nagy & Király, 2009). The community did not see CS as a business, 
but as a medium or tool with no corporate office, salaries or advertising. The 
homogeneity, trust, and reciprocity amongst the membership base (Liu, Nie, & Li, 
2016; Rosen, Lafontaine, & Hendrickson, 2011) became an inventive force as they 
constructed a community around communal-sharing expectations and behavior 
(Schöpf, 2015). The interpersonal relationships built through the platform were based 
on clear communal goals that were distinguished from the for-profit hospitality 
marketplace of hotels, hostels and Airbnb (Andriotis, & Agiomirgianakis, 2014; 
Celata, Hendrickson, & Sanna, 2017; Chung, 2017; Steylaerts, & Dubhghaill, 2012). 
The co-founders fostered and embodied these communal ideas through repeated moral 
stances in management discourse, with Fenton noting that ‘Couchsurfing is the first 
website of its kind to be owned and operated by the community itself, It’s a 
revolutionary concept’ (Prweb, 2006).  
Between 2003 and 2011, CS operated as a non-profit under the guidance of 
Fenton as Executive Director and Dan Hoffer, who dealt with the business end. CS 
grew organically through word of mouth, and by 2006, had 50,000 members (Prweb, 
2006). Funding was based on user donations and a voluntary US$25 address 
‘verification’ system launched in 2009. Community-based governance (Adler, 2001) 
led to an organizational structure formed in 2007 with five main teams: Leadership 
Team (renamed as Strategy Team in 2009), Operations, Community Operations, 
Marketing & Communication, and Product Development. By December 2009, the 
platform had 1 million members with 1,000 key volunteers facilitating growth (Gross, 
2009). The volunteer-supported phenomenon ran CS teams such as the ‘Contact’ Help 
Desk, Groups Management Team, Media Response Team, Member Disputes and 
Safety Team and the Translation Team. As volunteers believed they were working for 
a non-profit, the site became entirely dependent upon their labour as the site grew to 3 
million members by 2011. Between 2004 and August 2011, CS raised nearly US$6 
million through direct donations, merchandise sales, and the address verification 
scheme, with US$2 million raised in 2010 alone (Feldman, 2012; New Hampshire 
Corporate Division, 2017). 
During August 2011, Fenton announced that CS was changing its legal 
designation away from non-profit. CS was sold, repurchased by Fenton and Hoffer, 
and took on investors as it went private. The change was promoted by Fenton and 
Hoffer as a conversion to a socially responsible B Corporation (Couchsurfing, 2011c), 
and was seen by many CS members as such. However, legally, the non-profit was 
dissolved, and was replaced by a new for-profit corporation bearing the same name. To 
investigate the conversion and subsequent impact on volunteers and management, this 
study uses a discourse relational model. This is not meant to explain a methodological 
case, but offer a study of a conversion of an innovative non-profit that many see as 
kick starting the sharing economy phenomenon, and disrupting travel, tourism and 
hospitality sectors globally (Cheng, 2016). With its 15 million members worldwide, 
CS was built on a basis from which many social, charity and B-Corp enterprises have 
recently emerged (Sheldon, Dredge, Daniele, Sheldon, & Daniele, 2017). The study 
will conclude with practical guidance on management of communal experiences, 
resources, norm and relationships within such organizations.   
 
2. Methodology 
This study uses a discourse relational model approach that consists of a latent content 
analysis using the software package MAXQDA 2018, to interpret discursive 
constructions in the data, and then articulate the analysis through a model. A latent 
content analysis involves a search for implicit meanings embedded in texts to explore 
what was said, done and shown, financed and technologized. The initial content 
analysis sought to examine the discourses at the structural level by an analysis of trace 
evidence in relation to the conversion. These systematically evaluated ‘social facts’ 
(Atkinson & Coffey, 1997) or discourses included the CS wiki (deleted in 2009), 
management issued videos (since removed from the CS site), CS blog posts 
(blog.couchsurfing.com), press releases and management emails/newsletters to the 
community (since removed, but archived at www.opencouchsurfing.org). Much of the 
official CS data was deleted by the management post-conversion, using the argument 
that pre-and-post CS had become different legal entities. 
In particular, the audience-directedness of CS blog articles, press releases and 
emails/newsletters yielded data, excerpts and quotations. This discourse is important 
as pre-conversion, they helped formulate, disseminate and sustain the desired 
alternative social imaginary of collaborative production and consumption in a 
non-profit. This had a tangible impact on social reality of CS volunteers and 
members. The analysis also allowed us to explore the change in discursive strategy of 
management post-conversion, and any disjuncture between the projected discourse 
and the ‘reality’ as perceived by volunteers as the conversion was implemented 
(Jacobs, 1999). This ‘reality’ or second stage was a discourse analysis of discussion 
posts from the CS ambassador group (1,793 members) between August 2011 
(pre-conversion) and August 2013 (post-conversion). This provided a microanalysis 
of volunteer narratives (Hart, 2010). This discussion group was created in January 
2006 and archived in August 2013, before deletion in early 2016. Ambassadors were 
volunteers who deeply felt the CS purpose. These official (but uncompensated) 
ambassadors were part of ‘an organization structure to support volunteers’ and were 
described as ‘experienced CS members who contribute their time to activities that 
support the CS community’ (CS, 2008). All forum discussions mentioning the 
keywords ‘conversion’, ‘for-profit’ and ‘non-profit’ were identified, and downloaded 
locally during October 2014. A manual check of all forum discussions between 
August 2011 and August 2013 also took place. After identifying relevant discussion 
posts relating to the conversion (n = 836), the post threads were anonymised and 
uploaded to MAXQDA.  
The messy, contextual and conflictual discussion posts were critically analysed 
and coded, so as to examine whether they were supporting (SO) or  sceptical (SC) to 
the conversion, with a code of ‘0’ for neutral stance. While partially interpretative given 
the unstructured nature of the text, and not easily susceptible to reliability tests, the 
analysis identified competing discursive articulations and meanings around the 
conversion. When viewed longitudinally and time-lined, the data indicated that 
negative sentiment towards the conversion and management worsened over time. The 
data was compared to particular events, press releases, media reports and management 
initiatives (Neuendorf, 2002). As the discursive battles regarding the conversion 
evolved, the readings sought to explore how official and ambassador discourses 
converged and diverged. The second reading fed the recoded data through a relational 
model (RM) to focus on the relational aspects between management and ambassadors. 
The sacred value protection model (SVPM) proposed and developed by Fiske and 
Tetlock (1997) and Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000) assert that when 
sacred values come under secular assault, people struggle to protect their private-selves 
and public identities from moral contamination by the impure thoughts and deeds 
implied in taboo proposals. While the SVPM has previously been used to examine 
intergroup social image (Täuber & van Zomeren, 2012) and religious and 
pharmaceutical marketing (McGraw, Schwartz, & Tetlock, 2012), it has not been used 
in tourism management literature. Tetlock (2002) argues that trade-offs can provoke 
moral outrage when there is an inappropriate extension of market-pricing relational 
schema to spheres of activity regulated by the other Fiskean (1991) schemata such as 
communal sharing. The model underwent a lengthy and iterative development process 
by the authors to ensure the SVPM accurately captured the discursive battles over the 
conversion (Rusbult & van Lange, 2003).  
As a strategy to add richness and colour to this research and to enable the reader to 
draw their own conclusions from the ambassadors’ own words, verbatim quotations 
were incorporated along with other social facts. Whilst not all comments reflect all 
elements in the model, patterns in the overall data were congruent. Quotes were edited 
according to standards for using verbatim quotations (Corden & Sainsbury, 2006) and 
consist of enough cases to examine the convergences (and divergences) of views 
before, during and after the conversion. The study proposal received ethical approval. 
 
3. Relational model: The SVPM 
The SVPM model is based on the moral economy concept and relational models (RM) 
theory, which has been theoretically and empirically validated (Haslam, 2004). The 
moral economy concept was first elaborated by the historian E.P. Thompson (1971; 
1993), who argued that peasant villagers held deeply ingrained notions of what was 
fair and just. These beliefs were often at odds with the budding market ethos when 
essentials were sold for more than what people could afford. In essence, the peasants 
expected their society to function according to a moral economy and operate ‘within a 
popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices’ 
(Thompson, 1971, p. 79) and when essential moral obligation regarding a ‘fair price’ 
was not met, moral outrage led to overt acts of resistance (Götz, 2015). Scholars have 
applied the concept to a range of contexts to describe norms of fairness and legitimacy 
within a given moral universe, with Molz (2013) and Mikołajewska-Zajac (2017) 
invoking the concept to describe the communal values within CS. Fiske (1991) argues 
that the moral economy (of sharing) is related to his relational model of communal 
sharing, which generates, interprets, coordinates types of social interaction and 
relationships. Communal Sharing is one of four relational models proposed by Fiske, 
alongside authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Individuals ‘use 
each of the four fundamental models to organize transfers of material or nonmaterial 
goods and services and to provide obligatory or ideal standards for such transitions’ 
(Fiske, 1993, p.51).  
Communal sharing values were built into the infrastructure of CS by 
collaboration, mutuality and cultural labour with ambassadors defending these values 
and the people and tools that supported them. As the co-founders cultivated 
communal sharing values after filling for non-profit status in New Hampshire in 2004, 
the platform attracted members who saw the co-founders and the platform as 
constructing and communicating altruism, transparency, inclusion and collaboration. 
These values were both implicitly and explicitly treated as ‘possessing infinite or 
transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any 
other mingling with bounded or secular values’ (Tetlock et al. 2000, p. 853). Most CS 
members believed the platform was subject to communal-sharing obligations and 
viewed relationships between members, as well as investments in time, labour and 
donations in non-market terms, given the exchanges created through the platform 
were not open to the monetary trade-offs prevalent in the commercial hospitality 
sector (Bialski, 2007). Fenton garnered support through the ambassador program, 
with deep interdependence and mutual altruism supporting volunteer efforts (Roccas 
& McCauley, 2004). This was established on the basis of trust built over multiple and 
frequent contacts at CS work ‘collectives’ in various locations such as Canada (2006), 
Austria (2006), New Zealand (2006/2007), the Netherlands (2007), Thailand 
(2007/2008), Alaska (2008), Costa Rica (2009) and Turkey (2009/2010). 
The communal sharing model is built on harmonious relations based on intimacy, 
altruism, selflessness, generosity, sharing, and concern for others. People consider 
resources as common and do not need to give something in order to get something in 
return (Fiske, 1992). This in turn leads to members to engage in service co-creation 
and volunteering, given its congruent with the notion of pooling resources. All parties 
are mutually dependent on each other, creating relationship characterized by deep 
interdependence (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998), where ‘the completion of one’s own 
consequential activities depend upon the prior actions or ongoing cooperation of 
another’ (Sitkin & Roth, 2006, p. 298). Communal principles of control (e.g. peer 
pressures, work symbols and ideologies, interaction rituals) and a model which is 
intrinsically motivating (Fiske, 2004) produced volunteer teams who treated CS as a 
joint responsibility (Fiske, 1992). These volunteers were highly committed to CS, 
where commitment is the degree to which the relationship ‘is so important as to 
warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it’ (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, p. 23). In contrast, 
the market pricing model is built on individuals existing without community as 
bounded discrete actors mediated through a market system and values.  
However, as in many organizations built on communal sharing, a lack of proper 
record keeping, precise procedures and reporting responsibilities (Kirsch & 
Choudhury, 2010) were lacking. While the co-founders filed in New Hampshire to 
incorporate CS as a 501(c)(3) in March 2004, it wasn’t added to the list of registered 
charities in the state until November 2007. This led the Department of Justice in New 
Hampshire to investigate CS for failing to fully register as a non-profit and 
non-payment of federal tax. The lack of federal tax-exempt status hindered tax 
exceptions for donations and led CS to seek 501c3 charity status in late 2007. In 2010, 
New Hampshire’s director of charitable trusts questioned whether CS met the 
conditions for its public charity status in the state (Kamph, 2013). By late 2010, the 
IRS advised CS they would decline the 501c3 application (Longenecker, Moore, & 
Petty, 2016). Fenton and Hoffer's lawyer advised them their only option was to 
become a for-profit (Lapowsky, 2012). In March 2011, the IRS (2011) stated CS 
couldn’t guarantee the charitable activity of its members and denied the application. 
CS filled a petition on April 7, 2011, asking New Hampshire’s attorney general’s 
office permission to dissolve itself. A tax and auditing firm, Grant Thornton (2010) 
valued assets at just under US$640,000 in a report published on December 31st, 2010. 
The cofounders petitioned a New Hampshire court for authorization to buy the assets 
itself, telling the court that nobody else could receive the assets and that there were no 
interested parties to be notified of the plan to sell CS. The judge approved the move 
on July 6 and the assets were sold to the C-Corporation ‘Better World Through Travel’ 
(BWTT) incorporated in Delaware on May 3rd, 2011 for US$637,800. The majority 
shareholders of BWTT were Fenton and Hoffer. They issued shares to themselves and 
sold a minority share for US$7.6 million to venture capital firms, Benchmark Capital 
and Omidyar Network to gain investment. They also paid off federal back-taxes to the 
IRS, paid legal fees and provided US$600,000 to a New Hampshire Charitable 
Foundation. In June, the company filed for the right to do business in California and 
was renamed CouchSurfing International Inc. with Hoffer as CEO. The original CS 
was legally dissolved in November 2011.  
While some key volunteers in a Team Member News Special Bulletin were told 
on April 16, 2011 that changes were coming, Fenton only informed the ambassadors 
on August 23 that CS was to become a Certified B Corporation (B-Corp) (Chen & 
Kelly, 2014). On August 24, 2011, Fenton sent a three page note to 1,000 key 
volunteers and an email (CS, 2011a) to the community announcing that CS had 
become a B-Corp, and had accepted investment capital. While the announcement saw 
Fenton receiving over 1,500 emails questioning whether the communal sharing 
relationships could be reconciled with what on the surface seemed a move towards a 
market pricing model (Lapowesky, 2012), the ambassadors default cognitive reaction 
was to show loyalty (Kaltcheva, Patino, Laric, Pitta, & Imparato, 2014). In the model, 
justifications are accepted when it is difficult to process information and weigh the 
credibility of claims (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1z990; Tetlock, 2002). Given the deep 
interdependence between management and ambassadors, only a minority of 
ambassadors out rightly rejected the conversion. While Matt, France, Aug 25, 2011 
asked ‘We didn't get that money for free, did we? What’s in for them?,’ most 
ambassadors, such as Jack, Jason, and Alan wanted to wait and see.  
 Personally I would've preferred it still being a non-profit, but with the system not 
really built to handle all this traffic that millions of members generate, some extra 
cash to put into better coding so we don't have to endure all these ‘system down’ 
messages, I'll be a happy camper. Jack, Sweden, Aug 27, 2011. 
 
I understand much of the blocks on 'modernisation' of the site has been as a result of 
conditions imposed by the 503c application process….then now that the blocks are 
removed, fingers crossed... :) Jason, Scotland, Aug, 24, 2011. 
 
Apparently Casey is smart enough to partner up with such people, who I know it's 
hard to believe may not have the almighty dollar as their motive in life. The money 
they invested in CS is like a nickel to you and me. Just maybe they are interested to 
see what good CS can do besides make a profit for the nickel they invested. I think we 
will be okay folks. Alan, United States, Aug 27, 2011. 
 
Even though ambassadors were a separate equivalence class, the communal sharing 
model permits ‘differentiation or contrast, but no numerical comparisons’ (Fiske & 
Tetlock, 1997, p. 258). As consensus and unity through communication are the 
expressions of communal decision making, ambassadors had come to expect 
consultation in delivering a well-functioning platform. They had expected the 
co-founders to ask the community to pool resources to fulfil collective needs without 
seeking the aid of outsiders. Matt, Czech Republic, August 29, 2011 noted that ‘It just 
seems a bit unfair to change the direction like this from NGO to Corp. Casey never 
asked to help, I am sure we would find 1 million in donations.’ CS management failed 
to anticipate ambassador concerns over consultation, dialogue, seeking resources from 
outsiders as well as the obligation not to omit information. 
Accompanying the announcement to convert were communally-focused 
justifications for the conversion. In a series of videos produced by a PR Agency 
(Moreau, 2011), Fenton explains ‘Even though being a non-profit has been a major 
defining feature of CouchSurfing, it isn’t Couchsurfing’s core identity.’ Fenton and 
Hoffer were put through an intensive media-training program (Lapowsky, 2012) and 
organized a 12 city world city tour by Fenton starting September 2011 where he 
(management) promised to be accountable to all the people who had a stake in CS 
(Fenton, 2011a; Couchsurfing, 2011c). McGraw and Tetlock (2005) argue 
organizations have considerable public-relations latitude and resources to craft and 
communicate effective reframing messages to justify norm violations and assuage 
distress over market-pricing strategies. The co-founders believed ambassadors could 
be assured that the cash infusion would not foster market practices. Rather than 
structure the decision as a taboo trade-off, which is defined as ‘any explicit mental 
comparison or social transaction that violates deeply held normative intuitions about 
the integrity, even sanctity, of certain forms of relationships and of the moral-political 
values that derive from those relations’ (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, p. 256), the decision 
was structured as a tragic trade-off, where management was forced to make a decision 
to keep the community alive (Chorus, Pudāne, Mouter, & Campbell, 2017). Fenton 
and Hoffer sought to reframe the market-pricing strategy as communally-focused by 
framing the normative breach into something less distressing (Aaker, Fournier, & 
Brasel; 2004; McGraw, Schwartz, & Tetlock, 2012). The main justification was that 
the IRS would never allow CS to qualify as a non-profit and that income did not keep 
up with the network’s growth. The IRS was faulted as the outsiders who made the 
incorrect interpretations. Initial communication with volunteers did not explicitly 
mention it was now a C-Corporation, and only noted that it had received a B-Corp 
certification with funding from socially minded and philanthropic investors 
(Couchsurfing, 2011a). Fenton argued that CS was now a social enterprise, which 
meant it could focus on things other than profit. Press releases on August 24 (Krubner, 
2011) and August 26 (Business Wire, 2011) and an email to the community on 
August 27 (Couchsurfing, 2011b) failed to indicate the new legal status, Fenton 
argued that: 
 
Just because we’re not a non-profit doesn’t mean we’re actually ‘for’ profit. 
CouchSurfing is not for sale, and money is not our goal. We recognize that the 
community is what makes this movement real and supporting it is what our 
organization is here for. Everyone on our staff is a CouchSurfing member, and we 
want to keep it that way. 
 
The communally focused relational justifications meant resistance was initially mute, 
with an October 2011 change.org petition against the conversion receiving only 882 
signatories. However, extensions of market-pricing norms discovered by members 
disturbed the values that were meant to be infinitely important. Ambassador anger 
grew as details emerged about the lack of paperwork and how a pre-conversion 
valuation of US$637,800 could result in a US$7 million investment for a minority 
stake. Questions emerged as to why CS hadn’t appealed or applied for other 
non-profit statuses. Members also noted that the B-Corp designation had no legal 
basis, and was a tool often utilised by for-profit corporations to suggest they were not 
a ‘real’ for-profit corporation (Stammer, 2016; Wohler, 2011). Ambassadors in late 
2011 began to question why CS was relabelled as a ‘start-up’ organization with a 
CEO, stock options, venture capitalist investors and a new San Francisco office 
complete with in-house chef (Farr, 2012; Saiidi, 2016). As anti-conversion groups 
began advocating resistance and ways they could reverse the transition and/or agitate 
against it, Fenton and Hoffer became to be seen as hypocritical by not reaffirming 
their commitment to communal values (Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt, 2017).  
Given that trust within the communal sharing mode is based on deep 
interdependence, a byproduct of the conversion was the risk of management being 
accused of betrayal if they were perceived to be acting in their own interests. Having 
not enough insight on the risk side meant the perceived lack of commitment to the 
fundamental nature of communal relationships by Fenton and Hoffer led ambassadors 
to believe the conversion as a violation of values. Although bound by community 
norms to ‘subordinate profit-seeking to the needs of the community’ (Martin & 
Schouten, 2013, p.868), Hoffer was found to have announced that the conversion was 
the first step towards an initial public offering (IPO) (Reventós, 2011). He also 
admitted he had written up a contract with Fenton to detail what would happen if CS 
were to ever go for-profit (Txakeeyang, 2011). Members found out Hoffer had been 
working as an ‘Entrepreneur In Residence’ (Sep 2010 – Aug 2011) at the same 
Benchmark Capital who invested in CS. The profile of new investors, pictures of the 
San Francisco office and a new management team with commercial pasts suggested a 
conspicuous market approach. Kreps et al. (2017) using meta-analyses of 15 studies 
argue that when leaders change their moral minds, audiences view them as less 
effective and less worthy of support. Given the perception that Fenton and Hoffer 
were willing to misrepresent the conversion led ambassadors to believe the 
co-founders had made the ‘wrong’ choice in a taboo trade-off. Hoffer stood down as 
CEO in April 2012 (CS, 2012a) to become president (CS, 2012b). Fenton blogged in 
June 2012 that he and Hoffer were stepping back from the day-to-day involvement 
(CS, 2012c).  
The company brought in Tony Espinoza, who had served as vice president at 
AOL and MTV Networks and as CEO of several internet start-ups. Whilst Espinoza 
promised no major charges (CS, 2012e) after a further US$15 million was raised in 
August 2012 (CS, 2012d), a site redesign and rewriting of backend code replaced the 
code that volunteers had written. The volunteer based activities of the support team 
and the safety team were outsourced, and the Locations Team, Groups Management 
Team, Event Message Approval Team, the Verifications Team, the Translations Team, 
Contact Us Questions (CUQ) Team and Bug Submission Team were closed. New 
‘Terms of Service’ were introduced, along with salaried staff (Roudman, 2013). 
Espinoza’s lack of prior history in CS or non-profits created fragile interpersonal 
relations with ambassadors and stimulated a questioning of whether Espinoza and the 
new staff were committed to a shared moral vision. Ambassadors initially believed 
that Espinoza should adhere to the communal sharing norms and values, and share the 
work with them to move the project forward. Instead, clashes between the new CEO 
and ambassadors began in December 2012 when management replaced or culled most 
of its city groups which had been painstakingly build as ‘wiki’ styled portals and 
forums, with travel information and advice. The replacement ‘Place Pages’ did not 
have the features of the old groups, such as the search function, permalinks, privacy 
controls and moderator control. Matt, United Kingdom, Dec 6, 2012 explained: 
 
Congratulations - you, and the team you work with, are well on the way to wrecking 
the greatest community I have ever been a part of. The Groups was the bedrock of the 
community, the social side of CS. And the ‘Places pages’, far from being an 
improvement, have basically bulldozed much of the community side of that, in favour 
of something that looks more like any generic attempt at a social media platform. 
 
Even though management changes would be perfectly valid in another context, 
ambassadors felt they had little control over a tool they used to promote and 
self-organize communal relationships. Peter, Sweden, February 26, 2013 argued ‘We 
have been stripped of any helpful tools to help us help the community’ while Michael, 
Germany, March 5, 2013 wrote ‘it hurts me to see that something many hundreds of 
people spend many ten-thousands hours within many years to improve it, make it big, 
gets destroyed by some people who don't care what they do.’ As further changes to 
key tools such as the method of organizing CS events took place, there was increased 
conflict between ambassadors and paid CS staff on the forum. Jackson, England, 
March 4, 2013 argues that ‘It's our house, and our show, and without us they have 
nothing. They are our guests - and we permit them to use us and our data to make 
themselves money - in exchange for taking responsibility for shepherding this 
community.’ Ambassadors sought to distinguish themselves as a community from the 
new legal entity, with Tony, France, Aug 26, 2012 stating that ‘A CS ambassador is 
here to develop his local CS community. It is not directly to promote the CS website, 
but to develop connections between people. The CS website is only the tool which 
permits it.’ Travis, Germany, Aug 27, 2012, argued that ‘the CS community is a 
different entity from CS International Inc.’ while Elaine, Netherlands, Aug 27, 2012 
argued that ‘The community was created by and as a non-profit, not by a company.’  
For management, the steps were rational as they moved towards a market pricing 
model, which required the replacement of those informal systems applicable to 
communal sharing exchanges (Blois & Ryan, 2012). These social locations are 
difficult to manage and monetize (Perren & Kozinets, 2018). However, the changes to 
informal systems were too rapid and were carried out without consolation. 
Ambassadors felt they were neither listened to nor respected, with their agency and 
voice threatened by the perceived appropriation of their participation by the 
co-founders, investors and new staff who demanded a smooth transition towards 
market values. While Lisa, Perth, Feb 23, 2013 argued that ‘Do you understand the 
depth and breadth of experience, passion and amazing people you have at your 
fingertips if only you gave them the chance? Currently the only thing happening is 
alienation of everyone who would support you,’ Roger, March 4, 2013 noted 
‘unfortunately for Cs corp, they didn't study or understand the ready built community 
and expertise I heard Tony [Espinoza] bragging about to investors.’ The decisions to 
strip away systems, tools and content led many ambassadors to conclude that 
management values were not aligned with their communal values. Rather than receive 
continuity, conformity and adherence from the new CEO, two critical CS 
ambassadors for Chicago and Berlin had their profiles deleted in February 2013 
(Shetler, 2013). Given equivalence under a principle of collective belonging and 
solidarity, the abuse of members of their own kind saw a vitriolic backlash on the 
forums. New restricted forum guidelines were introduced in February 2013, to 
discourage ambassadors from promoting other hospitality platforms or criticise paid 
staff. As dissent grew about perceived censorship, hierarchy, profile deletions and the 
redesigns, there was a notable change in member attitude. A September 2012 
avaaz.org petition received 5200 signatories by explaining: 
 
We, the community of CouchSurfing, are the ones who built everything from scratch 
in voluntary work. Many of us still are doing everything to keep the spirit of 
CouchSurfing alive, even if it's getting more and more difficult…As this community 
was giving such a high social reward to all its users, and as we won't just watch how 
this all is destroyed by the profit-seeking shareholders, we decided to fight for the 
future of our community and will do our best to put it back to the track of the user 
based community it has been for a long time! 
 Each contestation about reconfigured terms of use, redesign, the ambassadorship role, 
and the potential of ‘unqualified members’ joining (Schouten & McAlexander, 1995) 
led to moral outrage. Each change to the inclusive and social infrastructure build by 
volunteers came to be seen as illegitimate practices that threatened the wellbeing of 
the whole community, and the values associated with communal relationships. Rather 
than a sharp disjunction between management and ambassadors, taboo trade-offs 
slowly contaminated ambassador’s moral identity (Tetlock, 2002) to create moral 
cleansing, in which individuals aim to restore moral self-worth in response to 
perceived moral transgressions (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock, 
2002). Moral outrage within the SVPM model posits that when people discover that 
members of their community such as decision makers have compromised sacred 
values, they experience an aversive arousal state that has cognitive (e.g. negative 
dispositional attributions), affective (e.g., anger, disgust, shame), and behavioral 
components (e.g. ostracism of transgressors). The SVPM model also postulates that 
the longer observers believe that decision makers contemplate compromising sacred 
values, the more intense the outrage they direct at those decision makers. As outrage 
at management missteps intensified, many ambassadors engaged in moral cleansing to 
reaffirm ‘core values and loyalties by acting in ways that shore up those aspects of the 
moral order that have been undercut by the transgression’ (Tetlock et al. 2000, p. 
854).  
By early 2013, a more sustained wave of criticism emerged on social and 
mainstream media (Shetler, 2013). As a protesting strategy, individual ambassadors 
contacted the mainstream media and build campaign structures on YouTube and blogs 
to affect the (public) image of CS. The main target was Espinoza, who many believed 
was planning to fully commercialize the community. His lack of any social bonds to 
ambassadors and perceived lack of internalisation of CS values, ‘in which one adopts 
another’s beliefs because they are congruent and integrated with one’s own’ 
(Sheppard & Sherman, 1998, p. 430) meant his efforts were seen as ‘polluting’ 
violations that tainted communal sharing relationship (Fiske, 1992). Their attacks 
meant he was seen part of the objectified ‘they’ rather than the subjective ‘we’ (Fiske, 
1992). Despite him reaching out on the forums and temporarily hiring an established 
ambassador as a Community Manager, the CEO and the ambassadors were using 
‘different models to generate different aspects of the same interaction and to make 
sense of it from different points of view’ (Fiske, 1992, p. 711).  
Conflict between ambassadors and management intensified when the company 
abruptly ended the Ambassador Programme in early 2013 (CS, 2013b), and restarted 
it with different terms and conditions. Management sought to verify the identity of 
each reapplying ambassador using their passports, gauge their activity to measure 
their performance and re-apply to post conversion CS values. The guidelines were 
morally distressing given within the model; parties don’t require written and detailed 
specifications, procedures, and rules ‘because they know what needs to be done, given 
their ‘sameness’ with the others’ (Kirsch & Choudhury, 2010, p. 316). Shelly, 
Australia, May 24, 2013 said ‘I won’t be reapplying for the new program. If I have to 
be measured and judged to keep pretty meaningless flag, it’s not something I’m 
interested in.’ Dec, Edward and Sam argued that communal norms were been 
undermined: 
 
Our old guidelines were about being inclusive, tolerant, open, and trying to be the 
best CSers we can be. This new list of guidelines …reads more like the 10 
Commandments. Instead of outlining how ambassadors can work together to develop 
community, they're about keeping ambassadors from harming the company. Dec, 
United States, February 23, 2013 
 
I don't remember signing any loyalty pledges to Couchsurfing. I do remember 
volunteering to help point people in my community. Couchsurfing is a culture that you 
cannot buy because you have VC funds. I suppose you can grab a database that was 
funded by donations and try to monetize it but that doesn't mean you bought my 
loyalty whilst doing so. I owe you nothing. Edward, United States, March 20, 2013 
 
CS has been trying to turn all of us ambassadors into corporate prostitutes. I've been 
an ambassador for around 4 years now. While it used to feel like I was doing great 
work, now I feel like I - and all future ambassadors are looked at as nothing more 
than corporate shills. The proposed program seeks more to create specialized 
brand-builders, not community developers. Sam, United States, May 29, 2013 
 
Management was no longer trusted on to do what is required to nurture communal 
relationship. Ambassadors morally ‘cleansed’ themselves through boycotts, political 
lobbying, negative word of mouth and resistance to co-optation (Thompson & 
Coskuner-Balli, 2007). Ambassadors felt they became the product being sold, along 
with their symbolic capital, connections, volunteering, and the community they had 
built. Changes became to be seen as part of a recurrent pattern of taboo-trade-offs, 
discursive framing and agenda-setting that supported the move to a market pricing 
model. Even though investment was intended for platform ‘upgrades’, ambassadors 
felt changes were undermining the community. Ritchie, London, April 16, 2013 
argued: 
 
Casey had previously accepted millions of man hours in events, hosting, volunteer 
coders, word of mouth spreading, to help build CS. We built this community, and gave 
CS a saleable value. "WE" the users contributed what makes couchsurfing.org 
valuable. "THEY" the founders sold it without our asking or permission, or even any 
advance notice whatsoever! And out of venture capital money that was only possible 
because of what WE gave to this community. YOU and your team are not putting 
value into couchsurfing community. The community investment has already been done, 
by us. I understand you plan to rebuild the website to a high standard. That will never 
be enough to us who made this community.  
 
CS members trusted each other and the co-founders to hold up their end of an implicit 
agreement grounded in deontic principles and mutual understandings about communal 
sharing (Luo & Zhang, 2016). Trust made it possible to share a commons, rights and 
responsibilities designated by their ability and needs. However, an organic, 
self-organized base with autonomous ambassadors was not compatible with a 
for-profit whose fiduciary duty was to investors who sought self-reinforcing growth. 
Many ambassadors felt trust, accountability and communication were replaced by 
‘management by orders and dictates’ (Jane, Netherlands, Dec 29, 2012). Shelly, 
Australia, Feb 22, 2013 argued that ‘Communication, transparency and the 
willingness to be open with your members are a choice, not something driven by 
corporate status,’ while Billy, Feb 20, 2013 noted that ‘How many times have we 
asked - some of us even begged - them to give us advance notice of important changes 
that impact the community.’ The lack of communication reinforced the tension 
between the moral and market logics and created contradictions, conflicts, and 
schisms between management and ambassadors, as well as between the new members 
who joined after the conversion and old members. Matt, United Kingdom, February 
20, 2013 argued that ‘How sad that things that have taken years to build up can be so 
quickly destroyed. Trust between the site owners and amongst members has broken 
down - and without that we no longer have a community.’ Kate, Denmark, February 
21, 2013 wrote, ‘They do not make me trust that CS is still our community and that I 
have any influence over it now. They did not make me feel I and people around me 
are any important to CS.’ Trevor, United States, February 21, 2013 wrote: 
  
CSHQ had its own agenda, and evidently a transparency problem, and instead of also 
extending its hand in friendship, it bit the hands that fed it, spit in faces, in some 
warped strategy to perhaps show that there was a new sheriff in town. Much of what 
CSHQ has done since has been to antagonize the active base, ignoring suggestions 
that would improve the site, dismissing calls not to move ahead with specific changes 
– if they even bothered to notify members of upcoming changes – and beating their 
chests with threats to delete and censor. 
 
While doubling numbers to 7 million, launching a mobile app and securing further 
funding (CS, 2013a), Espinoza’s lack of shared background and vision meant he 
could not span boundaries or exercise control. The CEO and ambassadors were 
unable to make sense of each other’s behaviour, coordinate, and redress wrongs seen 
by both sides, with his attempts at building trust undermined by the contradictory 
contractual formality he progressively introduced. His inability to govern by any 
particular model led to his resignation in October 2013. Jen Billock, who has been 
director of member experience at CS became interim CEO and was made permanent 
in August 2014 (Brown, 2014; Burns, 2014; CS, 2014). The new CEO decided to 
rebuild the site from scratch again and dilute the last remaining aspects of 
pre-conversion CS. While Billock worked to use the data generated by the community 
to offer advertisements, as well as partner with travel and tourism companies, there 
was no clear business model, as she too confronted the difficulties of moving across 
boundaries towards a market pricing model. While failing to impose control, dissent 
also failed to re-impose the moral economy, with Thompson (1963, p. 73) writing that 
eighteenth century food riots were ‘a last desperate effort by the people to reimpose 
the older moral economy as against the economy of the free market.’  
Many dissenting members left the CS ecosystem by choice, suspension or 
exhaustion. While Sophie, United Kingdom, February 20, 2013 noted that ‘I have 
finally given up on caring about things I have spent 4-5+ year nurturing and caring 
for,’ others began to self-organize outside CS. Sarah, United States, March 4, 2013 
wrote ‘We will make a difference... maybe just not on the CS platform we had 
thought.’ Fabian, Australia, Dec 27, 2012 noted that ‘The website can come and go, 
but there are many other places that you can stay in contact.’ Sean, Feb 24, 2013 
noted ‘Why waste any more energy trying to help a company that has such disregard 
for you or anything you have to offer? Take your spirit of volunteerism and use it 
someplace where it is truly needed, but above all, appreciated.’ A side effect of the 
conversion was that many members set out to create or revitalise non-profit 
alternatives such as warmshowers.org which gained 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption status 
in 2014, trustroots.org and bewelcome.org. Billock resigned in October 2015, and was 
replaced by Patrick Dugan who has never communicated in any form to media or 
members. After CS withdrew or was expelled as a B-Corp in early 2016, Dugan has 
pushed verification and a ‘freemium’ package to broker relationships through data 
based tools. While communal aspects of the community have eroded with normative 
breaches, with unconditional giving and strong in-group feelings declining, CS 
remains sensitive to its pre-conversion history. CS cannot yet be fully detached from 
its communal sharing past as a resistant legacy is built in. While a market pricing 
relational model has not manifested itself in purely economic terms, CS has settled on 
a hybrid model, which combines aspects of communal and market-based exchange. 
These combined logics can be seen other communities, such as geocaching and 
‘Burning Man,’ where consumers partially collaborate with entrepreneurs (Kozinets, 
2002; Scaraboto, 2015).    
 
4. Discussion: Managing trust and relationships in the communal sharing model 
Organizational leaders often speak about creating communities around their products 
and services, rather than recognizing that they are more often courting existing 
communities with their own histories, hierarchies, traditions, and practices. The 
hospitality exchange community that co-constructed CS and its values existed before 
CS with many ambassadors having left a platform called ‘hospitalityclub.org’ because 
of the absence of any legal status as well as issues with management transparency. 
While the communal sharing model provides management with resources and 
opportunities, such as volunteer commitment and deep interdependence, this study 
shows that management needs to fully recognise the associated risks. The communal 
creation of digital resources over the last decade has created new spaces for 
non-market and non-profit forms of communal and commons-based economies. These 
communal sharing structures bring demands ‘to coordinate with others, to judge each 
other, and as a standard to which they demand that others conform’ (Fiske, 1992, p. 
700) rather than top down mechanisms to punish violations of the ‘spirit of payment” 
as in market based exchanges (Perren & Kozinets, 2018). 
The emergence of sharing economy platforms such as Airbnb, indicate how 
hybrid profit-non-profits or so called social enterprises cultivate relationships 
characterized by deep interdependence so as to facilitate economic interactions. As of 
April 2017, there were over 2,000 certified B-Corps across 50 countries, including 
tour operators, NGOs and tourist attractions. As the number of organizations 
exploiting diverse platform aspects and interactions based on communal sharing 
within the tourism and hospitality sectors increase (Richard & Cleveland, 2016; Sharp, 
2018), changes to modes of operation in system of governance can present 
fundamental challenge to basic value systems. For example, once monetary value is 
placed on non-profit services (Weisbrod, 1998), relationships with clients and funders 
can change and lead to trade-offs (Blois & Ryan, 2012). When decisions to go 
for-profit or commercialise may be based on rational, calculated and strategic choices 
by management, bubbles of sameness and connection are broken when sudden 
changes cause mis-anticipation of needs and behaviours. Etsy, a certified B-Corp 
which emphasized the importance of human interaction saw employee, management 
and membership turmoil after an Initial Public Offering (I.P.O) in 2015 (Gelles, 2017), 
while the commercialisation of Tripadvisor between 2012-2015 saw numerous 
volunteer revolts (Kinstler, 2018). This study highlights how a mismanaged 
replacement of a highly social and communal system with a market based one, can 
lead to committed ‘communal sharers,’ and supporters of a sharing ideology to protest 
and resist management and disagree with less committed members.  
As the study uses a relational model not previously used in tourism and 
hospitality management literature before, the model can offer guidance to 
management thinking whether it’s possible to move members from a communal 
sharing model. The model also acts as a diagnostic tool and instructive guide for 
management thinking about the tensions between relational models, and the 
importance of member and employee views when making decisions. Rather than 
conclude that management cannot change models and or that venture capitalists 
should think twice before intervening in the affairs of an organization where the 
communal sharing relational model is manifest (Martin & Schouten, 2014), our 
analysis shows that attention must be paid to ‘the activities of individuals, groups and 
networks of people upon which key processes and practices depend’ (Johnson, Melin, 
& Whittington, 2003, p.14). By doing so, management in contexts other than CS, may 
be better placed to retain members through collaboration and coordination in order to 
create or retain trust whilst reducing uncertainty and vulnerability during periods of 
change.   
Kozinets (2002) argues members contributing to an organization, should be 
allowed to actively contribute to any move towards a hybrid or market based 
exchanges whilst retaining some nonmarket logics of mutuality and interdependence. 
Our analysis showed goodwill towards management after the initial management 
announcement, as members were led to believe that the conversion was about 
‘communal sharing,’ and protecting collective goods. It indicates the possibility of 
slowly moving CS members towards market logic. However, as the full and 
immediate privatisation of CS became apparent, members believed their capacities for 
interactions based on communal sharing parts were threatened and good will 
evaporated. Our analysis shows that significant mistakes were made. This study 
suggests that within organization utilising a communal model, management must 
recognize that members of the community have a stake in the organization and grant 
them greater influence by inviting them to play a role in any changes. This required 
that CS management tell the community what was going on and focus on greater 
transparency, disclosure and honesty. Management should have worked with the 
ambassadors to communicate changes to members, with Kay, Feb 20, Germany 
noting ‘Do you remember the time we had ‘collectives’ deciding on the future of the 
community and working together?’. The analysis showed that the strategy to hide the 
dissolution of CS, pacify the community by way of public relations, and ‘greenwash’ 
(Donia & Sirsly, 2016) change by utilising the self-certifying B-Corp standard failed.  
While this strategy may have been developed to reduce disagreement with 
members, management came to be seen as disingenuous as ‘communal sharers’ found 
evidence of managements lack of substantive coherence, consistency, commitment, 
unity, loyalty and commitment to communal-sharing norms. The analysis shows that 
subsequent management teams from outside CS never fully recognised CS as a 
collective resource and subject to communal sharing norms. The analysis also 
indicates that members felt the investment should also have been viewed as common 
property, and invested back into the CS community, rather than benefiting only the 
cofounders and new salaried staff sourced from outside the community. Management 
should have recognised those members, who invested their donations, labour and time 
into the project. There should have been full disclosure of the percentage of equity 
held by the new investors, the financial benefits to the co-founders, and full disclosure 
surrounding the benefits and costs of conversion as well as any alternatives.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The management decision to move CS away from its communal foundations to take a 
more commercial stance has come to seen as a ‘critical event’ by scholars, CS 
management, volunteers and members. This study found the SVPM offered 
explanatory potential for the real and consequential breakdown of relationships 
between CS management and ambassadors, and helped identify the missteps that led 
ambassadors to see the conversion as threatening the very source of culture on which 
CS emerged, as well as the social and psychological needs it met. The study helped to 
highlight how management changes to organisations build on a communal-sharing 
system can have profound implications for all stakeholders.  
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